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Key generation is a promising technique to bootstrap secure communications for the Internet of Things (IoT) devices that have no prior
knowledge between each other. In the past few years, a variety of key generation protocols and systems have been proposed. In this
survey, we review and categorise recent key generation systems based on a novel taxonomy. Then, we provide both quantitative and
qualitative comparisons of existing approaches. We also discuss the security vulnerabilities of key generation schemes and possible
countermeasures. Finally, we discuss the current challenges and point out several potential research directions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The last decades have witnessed the rapid growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) from a theoretical concept to a reality.
A wide range of smart IoT devices have penetrated into our daily life ranging from smart wearable devices such as
smart phone, smart watch, Fitbit to smart home devices such as Amazon Alexa and Google Assistant. We are entering a
new era where every thing/device will be connected together to form a smart world. Fig. 1 shows the growth of the
number of IoT devices in the past decade as well as the predictions of the growth until 2025. It is estimated that the
number of IoT devices connected to the Internet will surge to 75 billion by 2025 [114].
With the prevalence of IoT devices, secure device-to-device (D2D) communication is becoming more and more
crucial because IoT devices often need to be paired together for the purpose of file transferring, synchronisation, and
data sharing. Cryptographic key agreement is a fundamental requirement for secure D2D communications to achieve
confidentiality [131]. Key generation, also called key agreement or establishment, refers to the process of generating
the same cryptographic key between two devices that have no prior secret. Alternative terminologies, such as device
association, device pairing, or device binding, have the same meaning but are adopted by other literature [19]. Essentially,
the underlying concept remains the same, i.e., to establish a secure communication channel among multiple IoT devices.
In the following, we will use key generation, key agreement, key establishment and device pairing interchangeably in
spite of the minor differences in some contexts [30]. Broadly speaking, key generation can be divided into two classes:
authenticated key generation and unauthenticated key generation. In the authenticated key generation, one of the
communication parties can verify the identity of the other device. While in the unauthenticated key generation, they
simply generate a pair of key without authenticating each other.
Secure key establishment between two parties can be completed by public key cryptography (PKC) [112]. PKC
schemes require a public key infrastructure (PKI) and are computationally expensive as they usually rely on complicated
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Fig. 1. Number of IoT devices from 2015 to 2025 [114]. Fig. 2. Taxonomy of our survey.
mathematical problems, e.g., discrete logarithm algorithm. Hence, PKC solutions may not be suitable to resource-
constrained devices operating in pervasive environments due to both the absence of PKI and the required high
computational overhead. Another solution is pre-shared key (PSK) scheme. However, PSK scheme lacks scalability
which makes them inappropriate especially in the cases of large-scale sensor deployments and mobile scenarios.
The resource constraints and the absence of common trust infrastructure motivate researchers to seek alternative
key generation approaches by exploring the features and functions integrated in IoT devices themselves. Existing key
generation systems are based on a common principle: if multiple devices can observe a common signal (e.g, sound,
temperature, or motion) from a specific channel, their observations can be used as materials to generate random keys.
Prior researches have yielded a massive number of technically sound systems relying on various auxiliary out-of-band
(OOB) channels such as visual channel [80], acoustic channel [105] and sensing channel [79].
The concept of IoT device pairing is not new and there already exist several literature surveying this area [30, 82, 108,
150]. However, with the advent of new wireless technologies (e.g., LoRa) and new hardware (e.g., bio-sensor), many
novel secure device pairing schemes have been proposed recently [95, 99, 102, 138]. Unfortunately, these surveys do not
capture the recent advances in IoT device pairing. Therefore, the aim of our survey is to bridge this gap in the current
literature. Moreover, the taxonomies used in previous surveys have some weaknesses. For example, Shahab et al. [82]
categorised device pairing systems into three classes: weak, public, and private channels. However, the difference
between these three categories are unclear because bias is unavoidable when using subjective metrics. In a more recent
survey [30], Fomichev et al. analysed secure pairing schemes from three aspects: physical channel, human-computer
interaction (HCI) and application classes. However, when we review the literature we find this systematisation is not
easy to use in practice because a large portion of systems actually lie in the intersection of different categories. For
instance, many schemes belonging to application classes in [30] also involve physical channel and HCI.
In comparison with prior works, our survey presents two novel contributions. First, our survey complements the
previous surveys in terms of recent key generation approaches and systems. Second, our survey summarises and
compares existing works in a new perspective. Specifically, we use a novel taxonomy to organise this survey, as shown
in Fig. 2. The rationale for introducing this new taxonomy is to classify approaches by the hardware used by different
approaches, contrasting previous surveys that were organised from the perspective of HCI [20, 30]. We argue that a
classification based on the hardware interface is an important complement to previous survey works, as the fundamental
difference of materials or information used to generate keys is they originate from different hardware interfaces such as
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Table 1. Comparison of prior surveys/reviews with this survey (❍–none, ◗–moderate, ●–comprehensive).
Year Radio Audio Sensor Camera Miscellaneous Hybrid SecurityAnalysis
Performance
Comparison
[59] 2009 ◗ ◗ ❍ ◗ ❍ ❍ ❍ ●
[82] 2014 ● ● ◗ ● ❍ ❍ ● ❍
[20] 2014 ● ● ● ● ❍ ❍ ❍ ●
[108] 2015 ◗ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍
[150] 2016 ● ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍
[30] 2017 ● ● ● ● ◗ ❍ ❍ ❍
Ours 2020 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
radio, audio, and sensor. Table 1 compares the coverage of our survey against previously published ones. For topics well
studied in the prior works, we only provide a brief summary in this paper for the benefit of the readers and for the sake
of completeness, while the details are referred to those references for additional information.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we classify the state-of-the-art IoT devices by examining
their features and functions and derive a taxonomy based on the analysis. Section 3 surveys representative key generation
systems based on the used hardware and technologies. Then, a comparison of existing key generation schemes is given
in Section 4. Section 5 reviews the security vulnerabilities of key generation schemes and discusses countermeasures.
Current challenges and future directions are discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 A BRIEF SURVEY OF IOT DEVICES
In this section, we present a brief survey of existing IoT devices/products. The aim of this section is not to provide a
comprehensive analysis and categorisation of IoT devices, but to give readers a general idea regarding the features and
resources that can be provided by different types of devices. For a comprehensive survey of IoT systems, the readers are
referred to [6, 106].
IoT devices are essentially smart devices that support internet connectivity and are able to communicate over the
internet with other devices and provide a user with remote access to control the device according to their needs.
These devices generally integrate sensing, processing, and communication to facilitate autonomous awareness of the
context of a device. Wireless connectivity is introduced to allow sharing such context among IoT networks. Based on
application scenarios, we classify the commonly used IoT devices into three categories: mobile/wearable devices, smart
home/building devices, and network devices. Table 2 presents the details of devices discussed in this paper.
Portable/wearable devices. Portable/wearable devices are smart electronic devices that are worn close to and/or
on the surface of the skin or carried by a user. These devices are often called wearables for short and examples of such
devices include smart glass, smart watch, and smart clothing. Here we also classify mobile phone into this category
because many so-called mobile devices are not mobile themselves, it is the host that carries these devices is mobile. As
shown in Table 2, these devices are usually equipped with a variety of sensors that can monitor, detect, analyse and
transmit information about user’s context such as location, motion, heart rate etc. They also have built-in microphone,
speaker and different wireless connectivity functionalities. Therefore, compared to the other two types of devices,
wearable devices can provide more information to generate keys. Indeed, a large portion of existing key generation
systems are based on wearable devices [49, 107, 110, 134, 137, 141].
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Table 2. A summary of common IoT devices.
Category Subcategory Example products Common Features
Portable/Wearable
Devices
Smart phone
IPhone
Samsung phone
Huawei phone
Sensors: camera, accelerometer, gyroscope, geomagnetic sensor, barometer,
proximity sensor, ambient light sensor
Wireless Connectivity: Bluetooth 5.0, Wi-Fi, GPS, LTE, GSM, NFC, iBeacon
Microphone, Speaker: Yes
Smart watch Apple WatchHuawei Watch
Sensors: accelerometer, gyroscope, geomagnetic sensor, optical heart rate sensor,
ambient light sensor, air pressure sensor, capacitive sensor,
Wireless Connectivity: Bluetooth, BLE, NFC, GPS
Microphone, Speaker: Yes
Smart glass
Google Glass
Vuzix Smart Glass
Magic Leep One
Sensors: camera, accelerometer, gyroscope, geomagnetic sensor,
multi-touch gesture touchpad, IR eye tracking, depth sensor
Wireless Connectivity: Bluetooth, Wi-Fi
Microphone, Speaker: Yes
Smart clothing Mercury Intelligent JacketNadi X Yoga Pants
Sensors: accelerometer, internal and external temperature sensor
Wireless Connectivity: Bluetooth
Output component: a smart thermostat, haptic feedback (vibration)
Microphone, Speaker: No
Smart shoes Nike Adapt BB 2.0 Shoes
Sensors: accelerometer, gyroscope, capacitive touch controller
Wireless Connectivity: BLE
Microphone, Speaker: No
Smart home/Building
Devices
Smart speaker Google AssistantAmazon Echo
Sensors: No
Wireless Connectivity: Bluetooth 5.0, Wi-Fi
Microphone, Speaker: Yes
Smart display Google Nest HubLenovo Smart Display
Sensors: capacitive touch screen, ambient light sensor
Wireless Connectivity: Bluetooth 5.0, Wi-Fi
Microphone, Speaker: Yes
Smart bulb Philips HueLifx Z LED Strip
Sensors: No
Wireless Connectivity: Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, ZigBee
Microphone, Speaker: No
Miscellaneous Bosch BCC50Google Nest Secure System
Sensors: thermostat, motion sensor, vibration sensor, humidity sensor,
PIR sensor, proximity sensor, etc
Wireless connectivity: Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC, ZigBee, Cellular
Microphone, Speaker: depending on specific device
Network Devices
Wi-Fi Google Nest WifiTP-Link Deco X60
Sensors: No
Wireless connectivity: Yes, depending on the specific communication technology
Microphone, Speaker: No
ZigBee Sangsung SmartThings HubHive Hub
LoRa Arduino MKR WAN 1300Cisco IR 910
Bluetooth Wink Hub
RFID LANMU RFID Card Reader
5G HTC 5G Hub
Smart home/building devices. There are a variety of smart home/building devices ranging from smart sensors
(e.g., proximity sensor and vibration sensor) to smart appliances (e.g., Bosch BCC50). Although several smart home
applications have built-in sensors, a large majority of them do not have sensors, microphone and speaker. Key generation
systems for smart home/building devices usually exploit the common context information that can be measured by
heterogeneous sensors [36, 81].
Network devices. Network devices are physical devices that are needed on a computer network to communicate
and interact with hardware. Network device usually do not have built-in sensors, microphone and speaker. Moreover,
each network device is usually equipped with single wireless communication interface. Key generation systems for
these devices are usually based on wireless channel physical layer characteristics such as Received Signal Strength
Indicator (RSSI), Channel State Information (CSI) etc.
The variety of IoT devices compounds the complexity of key generation systems for two reasons. First, the hardware
capabilities available, such as wireless radio interfaces, sensing functionality, and computing capacity, vary greatly
across different platforms as can be seen in Table 2. Secondly, the patterns of interaction between the systems and
between human operators and machines have become more complex. Therefore, to identify existing studies and
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Fig. 3. System model for radio and audio-based key generation.
encourage further work on this subject, we are motivated to propose a new taxonomy to systematise information in
this area. As shown in Fig. 2, we categorise existing key generation systems based on the adopted hardware interface.
The reason of introducing this new taxonomy is that the hardware interface is the fundamental difference between
different material/information used to generate keys. With the proposed taxonomy, users can easily identify the most
suitable key generation protocol for their application scenarios. For example, for wearable devices which are equipped
with rich sensors, users can select IMU sensor-based or audio-based key generation techniques. For network devices
which are equipped with wireless modules only, the radio-based key generation system is the best option.
3 KEY GENERATION SYSTEMS FOR IOT DEVICES
In this section, we survey the key generation systems for IoT devices based on the taxonomy in Fig. 2. Specifically, we
discuss key generation systems based on the hardware or the channel used to collect information for generating keys.
We divide them into six categories: radio, audio, IMU sensor, camera, miscellaneous hardware and hybrid approaches.
We will survey the representative works of each category in turn. Without loss of generality, we adopt the notations
commonly used in this field: Alice and Bob represent two legitimate devices that aim to generate the same key, and Eve
represents an attacker trying to obtain the same key via different types of attacks.
3.1 Radio
Radio communication modules have been pre-installed in many consumer electronics. For example, all the smartphones
have the cellular, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth connectivities. Fitbits are usually equipped with Bluetooth. Most of the IoT
wireless techniques operate at the unlicensed industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) band. For instance, Wi-Fi runs at
2.4 GHz or 5 GHz; ZigBee and Bluetooth work at 2.4 GHz; LoRa operates at the sub GHz and its frequency plan depends
on the regions, e.g., 868 MHz in EU and 902-928 MHz in US.
Radio communications are used to exchange information between devices. At the same time, they can also be
exploited for generating secret keys. Key generation with radio communications has received extensive interests in
the last decades [150, 154]. Depending the locations of Alice and Bob, radio-based key generation can be categorised
into channel reciprocity-based and proximity-based schemes, as illustrated in Fig. 3. In the channel reciprocity-based
scheme, Alice and Bob wish to generate the same key from their common wireless channel and prevent the key secure
against eavesdroppers. On the other hand, in the proximity-based scheme, Alice and Bob are located very close to each
other and receive signals from a common third user.
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Fig. 4. Work flow of channel reciprocity based key generation.
3.1.1 Principle. Radio-based Key generation, also referred to as physical layer key generation, relies on three principles,
namely temporal variation, channel reciprocity and spatial decorrelation, which will be explained in detail below.
• Temporal Variation. The signal propagation is subject to reflection, refraction and scattering and hence the
channel effects will be temporally varying in a mobile environment. These effects will be unpredictable and their
randomness can be extracted as cryptographic keys.
• Channel Reciprocity.When the uplink and downlink transmissions operate at the same carrier frequency, the
channel effects at both ends of the link will be reciprocal. This feature ensures that Alice and Bob can obtain the
highly correlated channel measurements and generate the same keys.
• Spatial Decorrelation. When Eve is located more than half-wavelength away from either of the legitimate users,
she experiences uncorrelated channel effects according to the communication theory. This property is essential
to guarantee that the keys generated by Alice and Bob cannot be guessed by Eve hence the keys are secure.
3.1.2 Protocol. As shown in Fig. 4, a typical channel reciprocity-based key generation protocol consists of the following
four steps: channel probing, quantization, information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
Channel Probing. This step requires bidirectional transmissions between Alice and Bob. In particular, Alice first
transmits a signal to Bob who will measure the channel information via some channel parameters, e.g., RSSI, channel
impulse response (CIR) and channel frequency responses (CFR). Bob will then reply a signal to Alice who will measure
the same parameter. This completes a pair of measurements. Alice and Bob keep probing until they collect sufficient
measurements, XA and XB , respectively.
The selection of the channel parameter depends on the adopted wireless technologies. While RSSI is almost provided
in all the wireless standards, CIR and CFR are only available in wideband systems. For example, ultrawideband (UWB)
systems are able to estimate the CIR [13, 129] while IEEE 802.11 Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
can obtain the CFR [70, 131, 149, 153].
Quantization. As cryptographic algorithms require binary input, the analog channel measurements, Xu should be
quantized into binary sequence Ku . This can be completed by comparingXu against thresholds and assign bit sequences.
For example, a mean-based quantizer is a very simple example. We can first calculate the mean value µu = E{Xu } as
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threshold. The bit assignment can be completed as follows:
Ku (i) =

1, when Xu (i) > µu
0, when Xu (i) ≤ µu
(1)
More quantizers have been designed to optimise the performance. For example, a multi-bit quantizer can generate
multiple bits per measurements and gray code is used to reduce key mismatch [86].
Information Reconciliation. There will probably be key mismatch between Alice and Bob after the quantization, due
to the channel variation, hardware asymmetry and noise. The mismatch can be quantified by the key disagreement rate,
given as
KDR =
∑
i |KA(i) − KB (i)|
lK
(2)
where lK is the key length.
Information reconciliation is thus employed to make Alice and Bob agree on the same keys, which can be achieved
using error correction codes (ECCs). Secure sketch [24] is a popular algorithm, which has been widely used in the
wireless key generation to correct the mismatch [125, 152, 153]. Alice first randomly selects a codeword c from the
codeset of ECC. She calculates the syndrome by s = c ⊕ KA and sends it to Bob. Assuming Bob receives the syndrome
successfully without error, he then obtains cB = s ⊕ KB . If the hamming distance between cB and c is within the
correction capacity of the ECC, Bob will be able to decode c from cB . Finally, Bob can calculate K irB = c ⊕ s , which
should be the same as the key generated at Alice.
Privacy Amplification. There will be information leaked to eavesdroppers during the information reconciliation,
hence privacy amplification is adopted to mitigate the threat of information leakage. In the literature, this is done by
extractor [125], universal hashing functions [44], or cryptographic hash functions [151]. After this step, key generation
is completed. Alice and Bob get the same secure key and they can use this key with symmetric encryption algorithms
such as AES-128 to secure their subsequent communications.
3.1.3 Channel Reciprocity-based Approaches. Channel reciprocity-based key generation has received extensive research
interests and been applied with a number of wireless technologies, such as ZigBee, Wi-Fi, LoRa, etc. As shown in
Fig. 3(a), Alice and Bob are located with a certain distance between them. They will then leverage the reciprocal channel
between them for key generation. Below, we introduce several representative systems for each wireless technology.
ZigBee. ZigBee is a popular communication technology for the wireless sensor networks and wireless body area
networks. It uses the IEEE 802.15.4 as the physical and MAC layer protocols. ZigBee operates at the 2.4 GHz and has a
communication range about 100 meters. RSSI is available in ZigBee systems.
To the best of the authors knowledge, Aono et al. [4] proposed the first ZigBee-based key generation protocol in
2005, which is also the first practical key generation system. The authors designed an electronically steerable parasitic
array radiator (ESPAR) antenna, which can be dynamically configured to introduce channel fluctuation.
Patwari et al. [86] proposed high-rate uncorrelated bit extraction (HRUBE), which is a framework incorporating
interpolating, transforming for decorrelation and multi-bit quantization. They constructed a testbed using the TI CC2420
sensor nodes. Their system can achieve 22 bit/s at a KDR of 2.2% or 10 bit/s at a disagreement of 0.54%.
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Ali et al. [1] investigated key generation performance in body area communications. The sensors were worn on the
arm of a person and tested with scenarios including high activity (subject working and walking), low activity (subject
seating and working) and dynamic environment (surrounding environment variation due to walking pedestrian). They
used a Savitzky-Golay filter to improve the signal noise ratio (SNR) of the received signals. They demonstrated that it is
feasible to leverage the existing communication packets for key generation, though it took about 15 to 35 minutes to
generate a 128-bit key.
Recently, Li et al. [65] proposed a RSSI trajectory-based secret key generation system for wearable devices. A
bloom filter-based error correction scheme was proposed to correct the mismatches and Karhunen- Loeve Transform
(KLT) [25] was used to enhance the randomness of the final key. The authors used both USRP N210 [28] and CC2530 [42].
Evaluation results showed that their system is robust to eavesdropping attack and can generate a 128-bit key within 1s.
Wi-Fi. Wi-Fi is one of the most successful wireless technologies, which has been widely installed in almost all the
laptops, tablets, smartphones, and many other consumable devices. Wi-Fi is based on the IEEE 802.11 technologies,
hence we use Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.11 interchangeably in this paper. Since IEEE 802.11 is first introduced in 1997, a
number of amendments have been released, including IEEE 802.11a/b (1999), IEEE 802.11g (2003), IEEE 802.11n (2009)
and IEEE 802.11ac (2013). Because there are numerous off-the-shelf Wi-Fi platforms, they have become the idea testbed
for key generation.
The work by Mathur et al. [78] is probably the first Wi-Fi based key generation system. They used both the RSSI and
the peak of the CIR. They designed a level-cross algorithm, which can achieve a high key agreement, hence information
reconciliation is not required. Their algorithm was evaluated both theoretically and experimentally.
However, since RSSI and the peak of CIR can only provide coarse-grained information about wireless channels, the
key generation rate of previous systems is largely limited even with the help of multi-bit quantization. To break this
barrier, researchers started to explore fine-grained channel information that can be extracted from OFDM. Luckily,
researchers find that CSI contains rich information about multiple sub-carriers of OFDM. Especially the release of tools
that can extract CSI from commodity Wi-Fi devices [35] open the door for CSI-based key generation systems which
later shows significant performance improvement compared to its counterparts. In particular, Liu et al. [73] carried
out the first theoretical analysis for CSI-based key generation when there is a multipath channel. Then, Liu et al. [70]
proposed the first practical CSI-based key generation system which achieved key generation rate of 60-90 bit/packet.
Since then, numerous studies have been conducted to investigate CSI-based key generation systems from different
application scenarios and perspectives [131, 149, 153, 156, 158].
Zhang et al. [153] modelled and analysed the time and frequency correlation of the OFDM by using Wi-Fi as a case
study. Zhang et al. [149] took a step further by extending key generation to multiple users. In particular, they leveraged
the Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiplexing Access (OFDMA) for enabling the access point to communicate with
multiple users simultaneously. However, Xi et al. [131] found that CSI measurements from adjacent subcarriers have
strong correlations and hence the generated keys may have low randomness. To solve this problem, they proposed a
key generation scheme, named KEEP, which adopted a validation recombination mechanism to generate secret keys
from CSI measurements of all subcarriers.
LoRa. LoRa is a new IoT wireless technique, which features low power, low data rate and long range. The first
LoRa-based key generation works were in 2018 [102, 138, 152]. Compared to the short range communications-based key
generation, LoRa-based key generation has yet received less attention. LoRa protocol only provides RSSI information.
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Ruotsalainen et al. [102] investigated the effects of LoRa setup on the key generation performance. They carried out
extensive experiments with different configurations of spreading factors and bandwidths. These parameters will affect
the airtime of LoRa packets hence the sampling delay between bidirectional transmissions between Alice and Bob. They
also applied key generation with LoRaWAN specification and carried out experiments in indoor and outdoor suburban
environments. They demonstrated that their system can even work when there was no significant channel variation.
Xu et al. [138] designed a complete LoRa key generation protocol. They carried out extensive experiments with static
and mobile modes including walking, biking and driving in indoor and outdoor environments. They employed a number
of signal processing algorithms to improve the key generation rate. They also designed a compressive sensing-based
reconciliation framework to reduce the KDR. Their experiment results demonstrated key generation rates of 18 bit/s
and 31 bit/s in stationary and mobile scenarios, respectively.
Zhang et al. [152] designed a differential value-based key generation protocol. They found the received power varied
significantly when the LoRa devices moved in a large scale environment. In this circumstance, the threshold-based
quantizer would produce non-random keys. In contrast, they quantized keys based on the trend of the received power.
They carried out experiments in an indoor building and outdoor urban environment. The experimental results validated
the differential value-based protocol can produce random keys.
Bluetooth. Although Bluetooth has been widely installed in smartphones and wearable devices, it is surprisingly to
see very few key generation explorations with Bluetooth and the first work is in 2014 by Premnath et al. [89]. Bluetooth
operates at the 2.4 GHz ISM band, which is shared with Wi-Fi, ZigBee and microwave, etc. Bluetooth uses frequency
hopping to find the free spectrum and avoid collision with other techniques. Premnath et al. [89] adopted this feature
and their system can still work even under heavy Wi-Fi traffics.
5G:. The fifth generation (5G) will be available very soon and has adopted a number of new and advanced physical
layer modulation techniques, e.g., massive Multiple-input and Multiple-output (MIMO), millimeterwave (mmWave)
communications, full duplex. These techniques provide new approaches to exploit channel randomness in a more
efficient manner. A tutorial on key generation with 5G can be found in [64].
Jiao et al. [46] investigated key generation performance for a mmWave MIMO system, which exploited the virtual
angle of arrival (AoA) and angle of departure (AoD) characteristics. A new channel estimation method was proposed to
exploit the sparsity of the mmWave MIMO channel. Their simulation achieved above 99% bit agreement ratio under
very low SNR (-10dB), which can significantly decrease the reconciliation cost.
3.1.4 Proximity-based Approaches. All the systems described in Section 3.1.3 depend on channel reciprocity to generate
keys. There is another research direction that exploits the co-location property of mobile devices to generate keys.
As shown in Fig. 3(b), when two devices are physically co-located, their radio signals will be very close to each other.
Below, we review several representative works using the co-location property of IoT devices.
Amigo [119] is one of the earliest studies that uses a common radio environment to authenticate mobile devices
without explicit user involvement. It adopted Diffie-Hellman protocol (also known as D-H protocol) to establish keys
followed by a commitment scheme to address Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. Finally, the similarity between the
radio signals measured by two devices is used to verify if they are in close proximity. The authors claimed that Amigo
is secure against MITM attack, eavesdropping attack and spoofing attack.
Mathur et al. [77] proposed Proximate, a system that generated a secret key for two mobile devices in close proximity
from their measured wireless radio signal. Proximate adopted the conventional key generation process mentioned in
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the last subsection: quantization, reconciliation and privacy amplification. It removed the reliance on Diffie-Hellman
protocol, but its bit generation was very low (only 1-3.5 bit/s).
To overcome the low bit rate problem, Xi et al. [132] proposed a CSI-based authentication and key generation system
called The Dancing Signals (TDS) for two devices in close proximity. Although TDS used CSI to generate keys, it
presented a novel key generation method. The keys were generated randomly and encoded by the CSI features. Only
the other device that had similar features can decode the key. Therefore, both devices can agree on the same key. By
not generating keys from CSI directly, TDS improved key generation rate significantly. According to their evaluation,
TDS can achieve bit rate of hundreds bit/s. Moreover TDS can be extended to support a group of users.
Some other proximity-based schemes are based on another observation. That is, if a nearby sender moves very close
to one of the antennas on the receiver, the receiver can observe a large RSSI variation. Instead, if a faraway sender moves
close to the receiver, the two antennas will not see a large RSSI difference. Some representative works are Neighbor [14],
Wanda [87] and Move2Auth [155]. Good Neighbor is the first device pairing scheme based on this idea. Wanda was
built on Good Neighbor but expanded to generate secret keys based on the channel reciprocity. Move2Auth borrowed
the idea from Good Neighbor and Wanda and used for a smartphone to authenticate a nearby IoT devices.
Co-location based approaches take advantage of the physical proximity to authenticate devices. However, these
approaches suffer from a common problem: the distance between two legitimate devices should be close, e.g., 1.25 cm
in Proximate [77], 5 cm in TDS [132] and 20 cm in Move2Auth [155]. Therefore, the practicability of such approaches
is low because the wireless transceivers are embedded in mobile devices and in some scenarios it is hard to put two
antennas in such short distance.
3.2 Audio
Currently, microphones and speakers are integrated in many IoT devices such as smartphone, Google assistant, Amazon
Echo and laptops. Acoustic waves, as a form of wave, possess many similar properties as radio waves such as fading,
multi-path, reflection and diffraction. Accordingly, a large portion of existing work have studied how to use audio
signals to pair IoT devices. We describe several representative systems that achieve device pairing by audio signals.
Same as radio-based key generation, the majority of works can be divided into two classes: channel reciprocity-based
and proximity-based.
3.2.1 Channel Reciprocity-based Approaches. Researchers also demonstrated that acoustic channel holds reciprocity [74].
Therefore, several acoustic channel reciprocity-based device pairing systems have been proposed recently.
Lu et al. [74] conducted the first study to verify the reciprocity of acoustic channel. Their feasibility study validated
three important properties of the acoustic channel: temporal variation, channel reciprocity and spatial variation. Based
on this finding, they proposed a fast and robust key generation system, FREE, for mobile devices. In order to not disturb
users, FREE used the inaudible frequency range 18k-22kHz. FREE works as follows. To estimate the acoustic channel,
FREE transmits a pre-defined sequence, which is modulated to the symbols of Gaussian Filtered Minimum Shift Keying
(GMSK). The generated signal is stored in a Waveform Audio (WAV) file and then transmitted by the speaker. After two
devices exchange a number of messages, they use channel taps [118] as acoustic channel features to generate keys.
In FREE, both single bit quantization and multiple bit quantization method [44] are used. The mismatched bits are
corrected by binary Gray code G(24,12,8). In the last step privacy amplification, FREE applies a universal hash function
to get the final key.
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The authors implemented FREE on several smartphones and evaluated its performance in four environments: indoor
static environment, indoor mobile environment, outdoor static environment and outdoor mobile environment. The
results showed that FREE worked well when two devices were within 60 cm distance. They validated the randomness of
the generated keys by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) test and also analysed the security of FREE
against possible attacks. Security analysis showed that FREE was resilient to eavesdropping attack, approaching attack
and imitation attack. Unfortunately, they only conducted simple pen-and-paper analysis and did not really calculate the
agreement rate of the attackers. The authors also compared FREE with several state-of-the-art key generation systems.
The results showed that FREE improved the key generation rate by 38.46% and reduced the key error rate by 42.34%.
Bala et al. [5] also proposed a key agreement system based on acoustic channel reciprocity. The proposed system
adopted the conventional key generation procedure in wireless key generation: channel probing, quantization, recon-
ciliation and privacy amplification. Different from FREE, the proposed system used sound pressure levels as acoustic
channel physical layer characteristics. In quantization, the system used a simple threshold-based quantization proposed
method [44]. The widely used Cascade protocol [10] was employed in the reconciliation. Finally, one of the 2-universal
hash family—Toeplitz hashing—was used in privacy amplification to address the side information leakage issue.
The authors implemented the proposed system on Samsung Galaxy On5 pro smartphone and conducted evaluation
in different environments including classroom, conference room and hallway. By carefully tuning parameters, they can
achieve a key generation rate of 80 bits/sec and a bit error rate of 25% before reconciliation. They also conducted NIST
test [100] and the generated keys pass the test. However, several questions remain unanswered in this paper. First, the
authors did not report the key agreement rate after reconciliation. So the final performance is not clear. Second, they did
not analyse security of the proposed system against attackers such as eavesdropping and MITM attack. Therefore, the
security of the system cannot be guaranteed. Finally, the key generation rate is significantly lower than its counterpart
such as GeneWave and FREE. It is because the methods (e.g., quantization method [44] and reconciliation method [10])
used in this paper were proposed more than ten years ago. So more advanced methods need to be proposed to further
improve its performance.
3.2.2 Proximity-based Approaches. As shown in Fig. 3(b), the idea of proximity-based scheme is that sound recorded
by microphones do not vary too much within close proximity, but significantly differ when two devices are fay away
from each other.
Schürmann and Sigg [105] proposed a system to establish a common cryptographic key for devices in the same context
based on ambient audio patterns. The system works as follow. First, both devices need to perform a Network Time
Protocol (NTP)-based synchronisation method to establish sufficient synchronisation. This is because synchronisation
among devices plays a significant role in their approach. The extracted fingerprints will be totally different if the start
time of audio signal differs several hundreds milliseconds. Second, both devices extract a binary representation of their
recorded audio which is called audio fingerprint. The binary sequences of two devices will be highly similar to each
other if they are in close proximity. Finally, they use fuzzy commitment scheme to account for the errors between the
binary sequences to generate the same key.
The authors verified the feasibility of the proposed approach in several realistic environments including office
environment, canteen environment and outdoor environment. The results showed that their protocol works well in an
office environment. In the crowded canteen environment, the matching rate will decrease if there is not a dominant
audio source. In the outdoor environment (a heavily trafficked road), it is hard to establish a secure communication
channel based on ambient audio only. They also analysed the security of the proposed pairing scheme against various
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potential attacks such as eavesdropping, brute force attack, MITM, Denial-of-Service (DOS) and audio amplification
attack. The analysis showed that these threats can be eliminated by a careful choice of the fingerprint mechanism.
Following the same idea, Karapanos et al. [54] proposed Sound-proof, a two-factor authentication scheme based
on ambient sound. The idea of Sound-proof is that if a smartphone is close to a computer, they will record similar
sound signals. So the similar sound signals can be used as the second factor to verify user’s identity. In Sound-proof,
the similarity score is obtained by calculating the cross-correlation between sound recorded by a smartphone and
sound recorded by a computer. To compare the similarities of two devices’ sound signals, they also need to be well
synchronised by NTP as the system of Schürmann and Sigg [105].
The authors implemented Sound-proof on many platforms. The browsers include Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox,
and Opera. The smartphone platforms include Samsung, Google Nexus, Sony, Motorola, and different iPhone models.
The evaluation in both indoor and outdoor environments showed that Sound-proof can achieve an Equal Error Rate
(EER) of 0.002. EER is the crossing point of false rejection rate and false acceptance rate. It means, out of 100 trials, only
0.2% of genuine user’s attempts are rejected and 0.2% of attacker’s attempts are accepted. Sound-proof can complete
verification within 5 seconds and work well at different locations and distances. Additionally, the authors conducted
a user study to evaluate the usability of Sound-Proof and Google two-factor verification. 32 volunteers participated
the questionnaire and the results showed that they perceive Sound-Proof to be more usable than Google two-factor
verification. Security analysis showed that Sound-proof can protect against remote attacks, similar environment attack,
and same media attack, but cannot withstand co-colated attack.
The primary limitation of the above two systems is that both devices need an accurate synchronisation which is
sometimes unrealistic especially for devices that meet each other for the first time. AudioKey proposed by Shang
and Wu [107] aims to pair two smart watches when two users shake their hands together. It adopts the same idea
as the above work but eliminates the requirement of synchronisation. The working flow of AudioKey is as follows.
The pairing process is triggered by detecting the fist negative peak during the handshake process. The observation is
the acceleration signals measured by two smart watches should follow the same pattern and reach peak almost at the
same time because two hands are held together tightly. AudioKey extracts binary key sequence from both time domain
features and frequency domain features. The Golay code G(24, 12) is then employed to correct the errors between two
smartwatches.
The authors recruited nine volunteers whose ages were from 22 to 29 to evaluate the performance of AudioKey. The
results showed that it can achieve a bit generation rate of 13.4 bit/s and key agreement rate of 96.7% for a 128-bit key.
They also analysed the security against mimicking attacker. If an attacker located 1.2 m away started key generation at
the same time as the genuine user, his matching rate can be as high as 73.25%. Although the authors claim that the
location of the mismatched bits are unknown to the attacker, the entropy of the key is decreased significantly, and the
security needs further validation.
Genewave proposed by Xie et al [133, 134] is also based on acoustic signal proximity. Their idea is that the acoustic
channel response is unique for a given device at a given location. The proposed system includes two major steps:
bidirectional initial authentication and key agreement. In the first step, they use the round-trip time of acoustic signal
between two devices to authenticate each other. Specifically, if the response interval is larger than a pre-defined
threshold, the device will be regarded as an attacker. In the second step, Alice and Bob first build the features of the
acoustic channels. Then, the bits ‘1’ and ‘0’ are encoded in the acoustic signal based on a novel sine wave-based pulse
coding method. Suppose Alice encodes bit sequence in an acoustic signal and transmit the modulated signal to Bob.
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(a) Shake well before use [79] (b) Walkie-Talkie [141] (c) Shake-n-Shack [110]
Fig. 5. Representative works of accelerometer-based device pairing system.
Bob can decode the same symmetric key based on the acoustic channel response between Alice and Bob. So both Alice
and Bob establish the same key to secure their communication.
The authors implemented GeneWave on Nexus smartphone and conducted evaluation in three environments: line-
of-sight (LOS) meeting room, non line-of-sight (NLOS) meeting room and coffee shop. However, they cleared all
human activity in meeting room to mitigate the influence of environment changes. The evaluation results showed the
proposed system can achieve high matching rate in the above three environments. Moreover, GeneWave can complete
authentication and generate a 2048 bits key in 2 s, which is 10× faster than TDS [132]. Although the evaluation showed
GeneWave can pair two devices quickly, the evaluation is conducted in a well controlled environment. First, Alice and
Bob need to be very close to each other (<3cm) to achieve high matching rate. Second, there should be no activities in
the nearby environment to avoid multi-path changes. Therefore, the usability of GeneWave in a realistic environment
still requires further study.
Although the systems above can achieve high performance as demonstrated in the evaluation, they can only achieve
D2D pairing. It is desirable that a group of IoT devices can be paired together based on the sound if there are a number
of devices present. Motivated by this, Gu et al. [33] proposed a group audio-based authentication scheme for IoT devices
which is called GAB-IoT. In GAB-IoT, there is a central device who broadcasts audio signal to nearby IoT devices. All
the devices in an audio-reachable distance can observe similar audio signal, based on which they can generate the same
key using fuzzy extractor [24].
3.3 IMU Sensors
In this subsection, we review representative device pairing systems based on sensors embedded in IoT devices. The
on-board sensors in IoT devices provide them capabilities to collect information about the ambient environment. Thus
the sensory information can be used to complement the limitation that two devices have no pre-shared secret. So far, a
variety of sensory signals have been used as common knowledge to assist IoT device authentication and key generation.
In the following, we survey this type of work based on their sensor types.
A large number of device pairing systems have been proposed by utilising the built-in IMU sensors. IMU sensors
include 3-axis accelerometer, 3-axis gyroscope and 3-axis magnetometer. Among these three types of sensors, accelerom-
eter is the most widely used sensor to design a device pairing system. This is because it provides a good source of
entropy for bootstrapping a secure communication channel in autonomous and spontaneous interactions between
mobile devices that share a common context but were not previously associated. The shared common context is usually
a daily activity such as shaking, walking, hand gesture etc. Next, we discuss this category of work based on the type of
motion used in each scheme.
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3.3.1 Shaking-based scheme. The idea of shaking two devices together to pair them was first proposed by Holmquist et
al. [39]. To verify this idea, the authors implemented a prototype called Smart-Its Friends, which is a small embedded
artefact that can be associated when a user holds and shakes them together. Smart-Its Friends pairs two devices without
explicitly generating keys. Since then, a large body of studies based on this idea have emerged.
The Martini Synch proposed by Kirovski et al. [56] is the first protocol that generates a common key between two
accelerometer-equipped devices shaking together. It adopted a simple fuzzy quantizer and an off-the-shelf crypto-
graphically secure hash function, which they called joint fuzzy hashing protocol. By implementing a prototype using
off-the-shelf components, they showed that their method can produce between 9âĂŞ20 bits of entropy per second.
Mayrhofer and Gellersen [79] designed the first complete pairing protocol, Shake well before use. Specifically,
they proposed two schemes ShaVe and ShaCK. ShaVe first used Diffie-Hellman protocol to establish an insecure
channel. It is known that standard Diffie-Hellman protocol is susceptible to MITM attack. So the authord used the
Interlock protocol [94] for protecting against MITM to exchange the acceleration data. Finally, two series of acceleration
data measured by two devices were compared to each other based on coherence. If it passes check (the coherence
exceed a predefined threshold), the key generated by D-H protocol is used as session key to secure their subsequent
communications. ShaCK adopted a direct key generation method. First, the FFT features were calculated from the
captured acceleration data. Then, the FFT features were quantized to binary keys based on candidate key protocol
which accumulated matched parts of the keys until it reached sufficient entropy.
In addition to the systems above, there are also a number of key generation systems based on shaking motion, e.g.,
Shake on it (Shot) [115], Shakeunlock [29], ShakeMe [146], and iShake [111]. They essentially use the same idea but
different methods to generate keys. For example, Shakeunlock uses coherence similarity to determine whether two
devices are shaking together while ShakeMe extracts discriminative features from the accelerometer data to derive keys.
Recently, another daily activity, handshaking, has also attracted researchers’ interest. Handshaking is a common
practice when two persons meet to express trust and respect. The motion pattern during this process can be captured
by the motion sensors in user’s wrist-worn wearables and then employed to extract secret keys for establishing a secure
communication channel. The first idea was proposed and demonstrated in Shake-n-Shack [110]. The evaluation results
showed that Shake-n-Shack can generate 128-bit keys around 1 s with success rate >99%. Motivated by Shake-n-Shack,
Jiang et al. [45] proposed another acceleration-based pairing scheme for wrist-worn devices. They enhanced the
efficiency of Shake-n-Shack by using an improved fuzzy cryptography scheme [3]. But their result was obtained from
Matlab simulation in a laptop rather than implementing the system on real wrist-worn devices.
Shaking is an intuitive movement with natural variance. Additionally, it is easy to learn and perform. However, the
usability of shaking-based approaches is restricted by the shape, size, and weight of the involved devices [18, 19].
3.3.2 Walking-based scheme. Shaking devices is intuitive, vigorous, and varying but only applies to wearable devices
that can be held in the hand or worn on the wrist. In recent years, researchers have found another common daily
activity that can be used to generate keys, i.e., gait. Gait refers to people’s walking patterns. Like other biometrics such
as face and fingerprint, gait is a biometric characteristic and studies from psychology and biometrics have shown that
different people have distinguished and unique walking patterns [91, 137, 157]. Therefore, mobile devices worn on the
same user’s body can measure the same gait pattern while devices on other user’s body have different measurements.
This fact lays the foundation for walking-based key generation schemes.
Lester et al. [62] first proposed to use low-cost accelerometer to determine whether two devices are carried by the
same person or not by analysing the coherence of the walking data. Their method worked well when two devices were
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carried in the same location on the body. However, there are two limitations in their study. First, there were only two
subjects involved in the experiment so the results did not fully demonstrate the feasibility. Second, their method only
achieved approximately 87% accuracy if two devices were carried at different locations on the body.
Later, Cornelius and Kotz [21] extended the work of Lester et al. to sensors carried at different locations on the body
including wrist, ankle, and waist. They first extracted seven features that are commonly used in activity classification.
Then they employed supervised machine learning method, namely support vector machine (SVM), to determine whether
two devices were carried on the same body. They used a dataset of seven subjects walking for 22 minutes to evaluate
their approach and showed that their approach outperformed the work of Lester et al. [62] when devices were on the
different locations on the body.
Motivated by these two pioneering works, Xu et al. [141] proposed the first gait-based key generation protocol
for on-body mobile devices Walkie-Talkie. It followed the traditional key generation process as in radio-based key
generation introduced in Section 3.1: quantization, reconciliation and privacy amplification. It can generate a 128-bit key
within 5 seconds (≈26 bit/s). The performance was further improved in their extension paper Gait-key [137]. Gait-key
utilised a multi-bit quantization approach to improve key generation rate and further employed error-correction code to
correct the mismatch between the initial keys. The time required to generate a 128-bit key was reduced from 5 seconds
to 3.5 seconds (≈ 36.6 bit/s). The authors also implemented Walkie-Talkie and Gait-key on MoTo E2 smartphone to
evaluate the system cost. Their results showed that the computation time of Walkie-Talkie and Gait-key is 316.8 ms and
419.2 ms, respectively. They analysed the security of Walkie-Talkie and Gait-key by asking attackers to mimick genuine
user’s walking patterns. They found that a mimicking attack can at most achieve about 50% agreement rate indicating
that their systems are resilient to active mimicking attack.
In another work BANDANA [104], the authors also used gait to authenticate devices on the same body. Different
from Walkie-Talkie, BANDANA proposed a novel quantization method and utilised fuzzy commitment scheme [51] to
account for the errors. Compared to the fuzzy vault scheme, fuzzy commitment is less complex and computationally
expensive in terms of key locking and unlocking. Their evaluation results showed that BANDANA can achieve 80%
similarity between devices on the same body. Because they only used the acceleration data along gravity direction to
generate keys, the key generation rate was very slow: it took approximately 96 s to generate a 128 bit key (≈ 1.3 bit/s).
The authors in [116] followed the same idea and simply combined the advantage of Walkie-Talkie and BANDANA
together. Their method used 3-axis acceleration data to generate keys and employed fuzzy commitment scheme with
BCH code to correct errors. However, their key agreement rate can only reach 79%.
In a more recent work Auto-Key [130], Wu et al. proposed to use autoencoder to speed up the key generation rate of
gait-based scheme. Instead of exchanging additional error correction information, one device uses an autoencoder to
predict the gait measurements at another device attached to the same body. Then the key was generated based on the
predicted accelerometer data. The evaluation results showed that Auto-Key can improve matching rate by 16.5% while
speeding up bit rate by 1.9×.
However, the systems mentioned above suffer the same limitation: they can only pair two devices and fail to pair a
group of devices. To solve this problem, Revadigar et al. [93] proposed a group key generation scheme for wearable
devices based on user’s walking patterns. The system works as follow. First, a hub device generates a random key using
random number generator (RNG). Then, it uses fuzzy vault scheme [50] to construct a vault based on the measured
acceleration data. Afterwards, it broadcasts this vault to nearby devices. The other devices can recover the random key
by unlocking the vault using their own gait measurements. According to fuzzy vault scheme, only highly similar gait
signal can be used to unlock the vault. Therefore, their approach ensures that the random key hidden in the vault can
16 Xu et al.
only be recovered by the devices on the same user’s body. Because the gait signal is not used to generate keys directly,
the key generation rate is up to 750 bit/s.
Since walking is a daily activity, walking-based key generation systems provide an autonomous and spontaneous
way to pair wearable devices that are worn on the same user’s body. Although all the authors above claimed that their
approaches can generate keys with high randomness, a recent study revealed that there is a bias in the generated
binary bit strings [11]. They also pointed out that the attacker can generate a highly similar key by video analysis.
Unfortunately, there has not been any work in the literature that can prevent this kind of attack. Therefore, it would be
an interesting future research topic.
3.3.3 Others. Apart from the motions above, other motions are also utilised to facilitate secure device pairing. Synchro-
nous gestures such as bumping was utilised to pair two mobile devices equipped with accelerometers. The intuition is
bumping generates equal and opposite hard contact forces that are simultaneously sensed by the accelerometer. Hence,
the accelerometer signal can provide enough information to determine whether two devices are physically interacting
or not. Example of such systems include Hinckley et al. [38] and BUMP [117].
Wang et al. [126] introduced Touch-and-Guard (TAG), a system that used hand resonant to associate a wrist-worn
wearable with an external device equipped with accelerometers. TAG is based on the observation that the hand and the
external device form a vibration system of which resonant properties measured by two devices attached to hand or
wrist are highly correlated. The authors demonstrated the feasibility of TAG by implementing a prototype on Arduino
development board and conducted experiments involving 12 subjects. Evaluation results showed that TAG can achieve
a key generation rate of 7.84 bit/s, which is faster than commonly used PIN authentication scheme. They also analysed
the security of TAG and found that it is resilient to passive acoustic eavesdropper but vulnerable to visual eavesdropper
using high-speed cameras.
Han et al. [37] proposed to use road bumpiness and traffic conditions as a common context to detect trucks in
the same platoon. Convoy (the name of their system) exploited the fact that trucks in the same platoon experience
similar road (e.g., bumps and cracks) and traffic (e.g., acceleration and steering) conditions. By using the embedded
accelerometers, Convoy used the traditional fuzzy commitment scheme [51] to establish the same key for the trucks in
the same platoon. The authors implemented and tested the Convoy protocol with real-world driving data. Evaluation
results demonstrated that vehicles moving in neighbouring lanes can be differentiated adequately by their context, and
Convoy can counter platoon ghost attacks.
3.4 Miscellaneous Hardware
Advances in microelectronics, embedded system and wireless technology, have led to a rapid development of new types
of miniature sensors in IoT devices which in turn create many new opportunities for context-based IoT device pairing.
In this subsection, we survey recent related work using new hardware.
3.4.1 Heartbeat Signal. The concept of using human biometrics to secure body area network communication was
first proposed by Cherukuri et al. [17]. Conventionally, biometrics is a technique commonly known as the automatic
identification or verification of an individual by his or her physiological or behavioural characteristics [43]. The
concept described here, however, is different from conventional biometrics cryptography systems. In the context of key
generation, biometrics traits are used as keying materials to generate random keys. To this end, the biometrics should
fulfil the following two requirements as noted in [88].
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(a) IMDGuard [135] (b) H2H [141] (c) H2B [67]
Fig. 6. Representative works of IPI-based key generation systems.
• Distinctiveness. The trait should be sufficiently distinctive on two individuals, so that the keys generated from
different subjects will be different.
• Time variation and invulnerability. The trait should change over time and have a high degree of randomness so
that the biometric characteristics recorded at different times would not generate the same key even they are
obtained from the same person.
The motion-based systems described in the last subsection are essentially based on behavioural characteristics.
Despite their user friendliness, they still pose some burdens on users. A desirable device pairing system should reduce
user involvement as much as possible. Moreover, the feasibility of such behavioural-based device pairing system is
validated on a small-scale dataset under controlled environment. It is still elusive whether they apply to large-scale
population. However, another human physiological biometrics, heartbeat, does not have such problem because they
have been validated on large datasets [17, 84]. Specifically, researchers have found that inter-pulse interval (IPI), i.e., the
interval between heartbeat signal peaks, is highly random and can be used as a random source to generate keys [98].
Fig. 6 illustrates the idea of heartbeat signal-based key generation system. Below, we discuss several representative
works utilising IPIs to pair wearable devices.
The first practical key generation system based on IPIs was proposed by Poon et al. in their pioneering work [88]. The
suggested system was validated on a dataset of 99 subjects, and the results showed that it can achieve a total error rate
of 2.58% when the IPIs were coded into 128-bit key. Later, the same group of authors proposed a more advanced system
which improved the system performance significantly [7]. The proposed system works as follows. To begin with, a series
of IPIs were captured by biosensors located at different body locations. Then, multiple IPIs were accumulated to achieve
better performance followed by a modulo operation to randomise the monotonically increasing multi-IPIs. Finally,
the mapped IPIs were represented by their corresponding Gray code to form the final binary sequence. Compared to
their previous scheme [88], the error rate with 64-bit key generated was reduced from 6.98% is 2.83%. Meanwhile, the
improved system required less IPIs to generate the same length of key. In both systems, the IPIs were obtained from
biosensor signals that can record electrocardiogram (ECG) and photoplethysmogram (PPG).
However, Xu et al. [135] found that previous work did not properly extract the randomness of IPI. Specifically, as the
average IPI of most people is about 850 ms, the 7th and 8th digits of the ending time are not random at all. For example,
suppose the first IPI value is 860 ms and its Gray code representation is ”1011110010”. If there is another IPI whose value
is 840 ms, then its Gray code representation is ”1011101100”. It is clear that the first 5 digits are exactly the same. The
randomness of IPI data lies in the least significant bits, so does the error. To tackle this problem, Xu et al. [135] proposed
the first comprehensive secure protocol for ECG-based key agreement system, IMDGuard. IMDGuard solved this issue
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by proposing an algorithm that can transform raw IPI data from normal distribution to uniform distribution. Then, the
least 4 bits were used to generate keys. Finally, IMDGuard used parity check to discard the mismatched bit blocks to
generate the final key. The authors implemented IMDGuard on TelosB board which utilised the CC2420 transceiver for
wireless communication. Evaluation results showed that IMDGuard required 61 IPIs, corresponding to 45 seconds or so,
to generate a 128-bit key. The author also validated the randomness of the extracted keys by NIST test suite [100].
Venkatasubramanian et al. [120, 121] proposed to use fuzzy vault to account for the measurement errors between
different biosensors. The difference between these two works is in [120] they used PPG only while in [121] they utilised
the combination of PPG and electrocardiogram (EKG). However, the security level of these two systems is not high
due to the limited feature size and high computational overhead. To overcome this limitation, Hu et al. [40] proposed
IPI-based key agreement protocol termed OPFKA. In comparison with the work of Venkatasubramanian et al. [120, 121],
OPFKA is more secure and energy efficient. OPFKA is based on the observation that secret features generated by a
sensor are ordered and only the sensor itself is aware of the order of the features. But this way is controversial because
the authors assume only Alice and Bob know the order of features which is actually a pre-shared secret. It contradicts
the normal assumption that two devices meet for the first time have no pre-shared secret between them.
However, as discussed in [97], IMDGuard and OPFKA have serious security flaws. For instance, by performing a simple
MITM attack to IMDGuard, the effective key length is reduced from 189 bits to 86 bits. To solve this problem, Rostami et
al. [98] proposed their ECG-based authentication protocol, Heart-to-Heart (H2H). H2H is a novel cryptographic device
pairing protocol that uses the randomness of IPI to protect against active attackers, while meeting the requirement of
lightweight implementation and noise tolerance in ECG readings. The authors implemented H2H in an ARM-Cortex
M-3 microcontroller to demonstrate the practicality of H2H in current IMD hardware. The authors claimed that H2H is
the first physiologically-based IMD device pairing protocol with a rigorous adversarial model and protocol analysis.
With the emergence of new sensors, researchers started to investigate the feasibility of using these sensors to detect
heartbeat signals. Lin et al. [67] proposed the first piezoelectric sensor-based key generation system H2B for on-body
wearable and implantable devices. A piezoelectric sensor is a device that makes use of the piezoelectric effect to monitor
pressure changes. The piezoelectric effect turns mechanical strain into electric or voltage current. This strain can
come from many different sources, such as human movements and seismic waves with low frequencies [139]. As a
piezoelectric sensor can measure vibrations and motions, it can achieve the same purpose as accelerometer in theory.
But researchers find that the output signal contains much noise [139, 140] which means the performance may be not as
high as accelerometer-based system.
H2B is based on the observation that the minor vibrations caused by heartbeats can be detected by piezoelectric
sensors on different body locations. H2B works as follows. First, piezoelectric sensors on different locations extract
user’s IPIs independently. Because these IPIs are obtained from the same user’s heartbeat signal, they will be very close.
The authors took the quantization method proposed in [135] which first transforms the IPIs from a normal distribution
to a uniform distribution and then converts them to binary bits by using the gray-code representation of IPI values. To
account for the noisy piezoelectric sensor signal, the authors proposed a novel compressive sensing-based reconciliation
method. Finally, they applied SHA-256 hashing function in privacy amplification to improve the entropy of the final key.
The authors implemented the prototype of H2B on a SensorTag board. They collected data by recruiting 23 volunteers.
The data is collected from five different body locations: neck, chest, wrist, waist and ankle. The evaluation results
showed that H2B can pair two wearable devices on the same userâĂŹs body with a success rate of 95.6%. Security
analysis of H2B also demonstrated that it is secure against passive attack, active presentation attack and active video
attack.
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Compared to walking and shaking, heartbeat signal-based key generation systems can ease the burden on users,
i.e., users do not need to walk a few steps or shake devices. Additionally, several large dataset are publicly available
online. For example, the dataset used in [40, 120, 121, 135] is PhysioBank database 1, and the dataset used in [98]
includes MIT-BIH Arrhythmia Database [83], PTB Database [9], and MGH/MF Waveform Database [128]. However,
due to the limited entropy of information source, this kind of scheme cannot achieve high key generation rate. For
instance, the state-of-the-art heartbeat signal-based system H2B can generate keys at the speed of 3 bit/s, which is
several order-of-magnitude lower than walking-based scheme (750 bit/s in Revadigar et al. [93] ) and shaking-based
scheme (128 bit/s in Shake-n-Shack [110]).
3.4.2 Walking. The aforementioned walking-based device pairing schemes use accelerometer to record user’s walking
patterns. However, the main problem of accelerometer-based sensing systems is continuously sampling accelerometer
will quickly drain the battery of resource-constrained IoT devices. To address this problem, a recent trend is to use
kinetic energy harvesting (KEH) device to replace accelerometer. KEH is the process of converting motion and vibrations
into electrical energy to power electronic devices. Human activities are the most relevant sources because wearable
devices can harvest energy directly from user activities. Therefore, KEH is a promising technology for applications
where batteries are impractical, such as wearable and implantable sensors [57].
Initially, this idea is proposed in the field of activity [55], gait [139, 140] and transport mode classification [60, 61]
for the purpose of power saving by not sampling accelerometer. The first piezoelectric energy harvesting-based key
generation system based on user’s walking pattern was proposed by Qi et al. [66] until very recently. The principle of
KEHKey (the name of their system) is the same as walking-based key generation schemes such as Walkie-Talkie [141],
i.e., the energy patterns harvested by multiple KEH devices on the same user’s body are highly correlated while it is not
accessible to outsiders.
KEHKey consists of the following three stages: sampling and smoothing, quantization, and information reconciliation.
First, Alice and Bob harvest energy from user’s walking independently. Then, they quantize the measurements into
binary key sequence which contains ‘1’s and ‘0’s only. Finally, they apply the compressive sensing-based reconciliation
method as [67] to correct the mismatches between their keys.
The authors implemented the proposed system using off-the-shelf piezoelectric energy harvesting products and
evaluated its performance with data collected from 24 subjects wearing the devices on different body locations including
head, torso and hands. The results showed that KEHKey was able to generate keys at a speed of 12.57 bit/s while
reducing energy consumption by 59% compared to accelerometer-based approaches. Additionally, they demonstrated
that KEHKey can successfully withstand typical adversarial attacks. Particularly, KEHKey is found to be more resilient
to video side channel attacks than its accelerometer-based counterparts.
3.4.3 Magnetometer. Jin et al. [48, 49] proposed magnetometer-based system MagPairing to pair two smartphones in
close proximity. When two smartphones are in close proximity, their magnetometer readings are highly correlated. The
working flow of MagPairing is very similar to ShaVe proposed in Shake well before use [79] . First, Alice and Bob use
D-H protocol to establish an unauthenticated communication channel and Interlock protocol to counter MITM attack.
Then, they exchange their magnetic fields readings. If their similarity is higher than a threshold, the DH key will be
used to secure the communication. In the evaluation, the authors implemented MagPairing on several smartphones
1http://www.physionet.org/physiobank
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such as Google Nexus 5 and GALAXY 3. Evaluation results showed that MagPairing can pair two devices within 4.5 s
with more than 90% success rate.
3.4.4 Electromyogram (EMG). Yang et al. [142] proposed an EMG-based pairing system which is called EMG-KEY.
EMG-KEY utilised the electrical activity caused by human muscle contraction (i.e., EMG) to generate secret keys for
two wearable devices. MEG-KEY works as follows. First, two wearable devices record raw EMG signal independently
when the user performed a random gesture. Then, the EMG signal was rectified and converted into binary bits based
on a shape-based key generation method. Finally, the same key was obtained by using Golay Code G(23, 12) in the
reconciliation to correct the mismatches. Evaluation results on 10 subjects suggested that EMG-KEY can reach a high
bit rate of 5.51 bit/s with a success rate of 88.84%.
3.4.5 Electrode. Roeschlin et al. [95] proposed a device pairing protocol for two devices that can be physically attached
to the body. The suggested protocol is built on the unique body channel: the body channel is used as a part of the
pairing protocol to allow two legitimate devices agree on the same secret. Any external devices have no knowledge
of the body channel characteristics, and thus cannot guess the secret. In the evaluation, the authors implemented a
proof-of-concept and recruited 15 volunteers to verify their idea. Evaluation results showed that the system can achieve
94.3%-99.6% accuracy.
3.5 Camera
As camera are ubiquitous in almost all smartphones, researchers have designed many key generation approaches taking
advantage of the cameras in the devices. Below, we introduce several representative works.
McCune et al. [80] proposed an authenticated key exchange scheme named Seeing-Is-Believing (SiB). One camera-
equipped device can take a photo of a 2D bar code which encodes the cryptographic key of another device. By changing
the roles and repeating the above process, both devices can achieve authenticated key exchange. The authors compared
their scheme with other key exchange systems using other channels such as ultrasound, audio etc. They claimed that
SiB is more secure and convenient to use because the user can identify the device to be paired visually.
However, SiB has several limitations. For example, both devices must be equipped with a camera to achieve mutual
authentication. The application scenarios of SiB are limited when one device has limited capabilities such as small
size and display. To overcome these drawbacks, Saxena et al. [103] proposed several extensions to SiB. The proposed
approach can achieve mutual authentication when only one device is camera-equipped. This is done by having both
Alice and Bob compute a common checksum on public data, then compare their results via a unidirectional visual
channel.
Buhan et al. [12] proposed a biometrics-based secure device pairing system, SAFE. SAFE used cameras to take a
picture of another user’s face. Then, they applied fuzzy extractor [24] to extract secret keys from face images. By
exchanging some information, both Alice and Bob can agree on the same key. The authors demonstrated that the
proposed system is resilient to eavesdropping attack and MITM attack.
The above methods are restricted to two-parties key exchange. GAnGs proposed by Chen et al. [15] and SPATE
proposed by Lin et al. [68] extended SiB to support group device pairing. GAnGs allows a group of devices to collect and
distribute authentic information by displays and cameras equipped on each device. SPATE requires users to compare
images on different devices to achieve group pairing. Compared to SiB and GAnGs, SPATE achieves better performance
in terms of efficiency, accuracy and user experience. The common feature of SiB, GAnGs and SPATE is that they all
adopt the barcode format designed by Rohs and Gfeller [96].
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In these methods, cameras are used as OOB visual channel to convey some secret information between intended
parties. The application scenarios of these approaches, however, are limited because of the unavailability of cameras
in most IoT devices. Additionally, these approaches require human computer interaction to facilitate device pairing
process. For example, in the work of McCune et al. [80] and Saxena et al. [103], the authentication is completed by user
answering affirmatively in the last step.
3.6 Hybrid Approaches
The above context-based pairing approaches improve the efficiency of pairing IoT devices by removing any human
interference in pairing. Using on-board sensors with the same sensing modalities, it is possible to capture a specific
physical background such as physical layer characteristics of the same wireless channel, the motion signal of the same
user, and ambient sound from the same event. Nonetheless, due to the heterogeneity of IoT devices it is impractical to
presume, in some scenarios, that all devices share a common modality of sensing. This limitation sparks some new
studies that aim to pair heterogeneous IoT devices by exploiting different sensor modalities. Below, we introduce several
representative works belonging to this subcategory.
Miettinen et al. [81] proposed a context-based zero-interaction pairing protocol for wearable devices by using ambient
audio and luminosity. The suggested system utilises context fingerprints to evolve the generated key which is only
possible when two devices are in close proximity over a long period of time. Intuitively, it is based on the fact that
devices belong to the same user can observe similar context information in a longer time than other devices. Although
the proposed scheme does not involve user interaction, it takes a long time to accumulate sufficient entropy to complete
authentication.
Han et al. [36] proposed a novel context-based pairing scheme named Perceptio for IoT devices that are equipped
with different types of sensors. Perceptio utilises time as the common factor across different types of sensors. It produces
event fingerprints that can be compared across a range of IoT devices by concentrating on the event timing rather than
the individual event sensor data. The principle of Perceptio is that devices co-located inside a physically protected
boundary (e.g., smart home) will be able to detect more typical events over time as opposed to outsiders. The authors
deployed a variety of heterogeneous IoT devices in a room such as geophone, microphone, accelerometer, motion sensor
and a power meter. Evaluation results showed that the legitimate devices in the same room can achieve an average
fingerprint similarity of 94.9% while an outside attacker can only yield 68.9% similarity.
Additionally, some other systems uses different combinations of sensor modalities to pair devices. To name a few,
Shrestha et al. [113] designed an authentication system by using the combination of four different sensor modalities
namely, ambient temperature, precision gas, humidity, and altitude. Liu et al. [69] proposed a pairing scheme for
wearable devices based on sound and light. Unisense proposed by Pan et al. [85] and IDIoT proposed by Ruiz et al. [99]
(the same group of people) leveraged video signals and IMU sensor signals to pair heterogeneous IoT devices.
Key generation schemes using multi-modality sensing present two advantages. On the one hand, it can be used
to associate heterogeneous IoT devices that have different sensors, shapes, and sizes. On the other hand, it improves
the security of pairing schemes against attackers because it requires the attacker to monitor the various physical
environment properties at the same time. Meanwhile, it also has some drawbacks. First, such schemes may take a long
time to complete device pairing because the frequency of some events is low (e.g., door closing in [36]). Second, due
to the heterogeneity of sensor data, the processing method is usually more complex and expensive because signals
measured in different sensing state-spaces cannot be directly compared. For example, Unisense [85] and IDIoT [99]
require camera calibration and coordinate transformation to obtain motion signal in the common state-space.
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4 PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Because of the diversity of different hardware and protocols, many metrics have been used in prior works. Yet, there
lacks a common understanding and sound comparison of existing systems in the current literature. Although several
previous works have provided comparisons of some early device pairing schemes [52, 58, 59], their studies only provide
quantitative comparison by using subjective metrics such as usability [59]. In this section, we first summarise commonly
used objective metrics in device pairing systems. Then, we provide a comprehensive quantitative comparison of existing
schemes. Due to space limitation, we only compare the performance of representative works in each category. Finally,
we define five goals of a desirable key generation scheme and provide a qualitative analysis based on this baseline.
4.1 Objective Metrics andQuantitative Comparison
Below, we summarise three commonly used metrics in key generation systems.
• Key generation rate (KGR). KGR represents the number of bits in a unit time that a system can generate. It
indicates how fast a key generation system can generate or update keys. For the real-time key generation process
a high KGR is desirable, as the cryptographic schemes need a certain length of keys. For instance, AES requires a
key sequence with a minimum length of 128 bits.
• Key agreement rate (KAR). KAR means the number of agreed bits over the total number of generated bits. A
high success rate or KAR can considerably improve the efficiency of a device pairing protocol. Ideally, it should
be identical for two legitimate devices, and as low as possible for an attacker.
• Randomness. Randomness of the key is of upmost importance in a cryptographic protocol because a key with low
entropy can be easily cracked by an adversary. In device pairing system, the randomness of the generated keys is
evaluated by the popular NIST test suite [100]. The NIST test suite provides 15 tests to evaluate the different
randomness features. For example, The purpose of Frequency (Monobit) Test is to evaluate the proportion of
zeroes and ones in the key sequence. The goal of Binary Matrix Rank Test is to check for linear dependence
among fixed length substrings of the binary key string. The returned result of each test is a p-value, which
indicates whether the key pass the NIST test or not. Conventionally, if p-value ≥ 0.01, we say the key passes the
corresponding test and it has high randomness.
Table 3 summarises the performance of representative works in each category. We have the following observations.
• Some studies do not explicitly report the three metrics above, making it hard to achieve a fair comparison with
other systems. For example, Shake well before use [79] used false positive rate and false negative rate in their
evaluation. In Miettinen et al. [81], the authors evaluated the performance of key revolution in different scenarios
but did not give a clear indication about how long it takes to generate a 128 bit key.
• Some works do not evaluate their systems properly. To be specific, some direct key generation systems do not
evaluate the randomness of the extracted keys using NIST test, such as Zeng et al. [147], Shake-n-Shack [110],
Touch-and-Guard [126]. While in TDS [132], the authors suggested that their key can be generated by any
sophisticated key generation method but do not point out which one. Moreover, since the key is generated from
a random number generator, it is not necessary to apply NIST test to validate the randomness of the key.
• For wireless key generation, CSI-based systems can improve key generation significantly compared to RSSI-based
approaches. Unfortunately, some communication technologies cannot provide CSI such as LoRa. Current works
on LoRa [101, 102, 138] still use coarse-grained channel information such as RSSI. Therefore, a future research
direction is investigating how to extract fine-grained channel information to improve KGR.
Key Generation for Internet of Things: A Contemporary Survey 23
• For behavioural and physiological traits based key generation schemes, activities involving large displacements
usually produce good results such as walking and shaking. The reason is that the SNR of the measured signal
is higher as motion signals overwhelm noise when user walks or shakes hands. In contrast, physiological
characteristics such as ECG and EMG have limited entropy resulting in low KGR. Moreover, they are not only
hard to measure but also contain much noise (i.e., low SNR), which further reduces the performance. But these
protocols can be applied in certain scenarios such as implantable IoT devices.
• Although new sensors provide more possibilities and options to pair various IoT devices, the KGR and KAR is
relatively lower than their counterparts such as radio-based and accelerometer-based approaches. Therefore, more
research efforts are required to further improve the performance of device pairing schemes using new sensors.
However, as these new sensors are not available on off-the-shelf IoT devices and usually require customised
hardware or prototype, these obstacles may hinder the progress of research in this direction.
Table 3. A quantitative comparison of different key generation schemes (– not available).
Source CommunicationTechnology/Sensors Features Literature
Direct
Key generation
KGR
(bit/s)
KAR
(%) Randomness
Radio
ZigBee RSSI Patwari et al. [86] ✓ 10-22 97.8-99.46 ✓
Wi-Fi RSSI Zeng et al. [147] ✓ 10 90 ×
Wi-Fi CIR Radio-telepathy [78] ✓ 1.17 >84.15 ✓
Wi-Fi CSI TDS [132] × 90-120 96.5-98 ✓
Bluetooth RSSI Premnath et al. [89] ✓ – >79 ✓
LoRa RSSI LoRa-Key [138] ✓ 18-31 98-100 ✓
LoRa RSSI Ruotsalainen et al. [102] ✓ – 71 - 85 ✓
Audio Mircophone/Speaker Channel response GeneWave [133, 134] × 1024 88-100 ×Channel tap FREE [74] ✓ 100-260 97-100 ✓
IMU sensors Accelerometer
Shake Shake well before use [79] ShaVe ×ShaKe ✓ – – ×
Shake Shake-n-Shack [110] ✓ ≈ 98.4 100 ×
Walk Gait-Key [137] ✓ 28 97-100 ✓
Walk Auto-Key [130] ✓ 3.84-11 90-100 ✓
Walk Ravedigar et al. [93] ✓ 750 80-100 ✓
Gesture Touch-and-Guard [126] ✓ 7.84 98-100 ×
Mag Movement Magpairing [48, 49] × – >90 ×
Miscellaneous
Piezoelectric sensor Walk KEHKey [66] ✓ 12.57 85-100 ✓Heartbeat H2B [67] ✓ 3 95.6 ✓
ECG Heartbeat IMDGuard [135] ✓ 2.84 92-100 ✓
EMG Hand resonance EMG-Key [142] ✓ 5.51 88.84 ✓
Electrode Body channel Roeschlin et al. [95] × – 94.3-99.3 ×
Hybrid
Microphone
Light sensor – Miettinen et al. [81] × – – ×
Geophone
Microphone
Accelerometer
Infrared motion sensor
Power meter
– Perceptio [36] × – 94.9 ×
Camera+IMU Gesture IDIoT [99] × – 92.2 ×
4.2 Subjective Metrics andQualitative Comparison
In this paper, we use the following five subjective metrics to evaluate a key generation system for IoT devices. An
ideal key agreement system should achieve high performance in each metric, i.e., they should achieve high robustness,
usability, practicability, ubiquity and security.
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Table 4. A qualitative comparison of different key generation systems (❍–low, ◗–medium, ●–high).
Robustness Usability Practicability Ubiquity Security
Radio ● ● ● ◗ ◗
Audio ● ❍ ◗ ◗ ◗
IMU sensors ● ❍ ● ◗ ◗
Camera ● ◗ ❍ ❍ ●
Miscellaneous sensors ◗ ❍ ❍ ❍ ●
Hybrid approachs ❍ ❍ ❍ ❍ ●
• Robustness. It refers to whether a key generation protocol can achieve a high KAR, success rate or true positive
rate.
• Usability. It refers to the performance of the device pairing system in terms of KGR, completion time, the degree
of user involvement and user’s ease-of-use perception [59].
• Practicability. It refers to the viability of a key generation scheme and is measured by whether the system can
work without replying on special hardware.
• Ubiquity. It represents the environments a key generation system is applicable to. If a system can work in a
variety of environments, it has high ubiquity, and vice versa.
• Security. It measures the security of a key agreement protocol against various attacks. The more attacks a key
generation system can defend, the more secure it is.
Based on the definition above, we provide a qualitative comparison for existing systems and summarise the results
in Table 4. It should be noted that comparison between different systems is not straightforward and challenging, and
our goal is to provide users with a general understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of each technique. From
Table 4, we can arrive at a conclusion that no universal approach exists, despite that different studies analyse key
generation systems from different perspectives. A system suitable for one scenario may not be applicable to another
environment. Meanwhile, there is always a trade-off between different requirements such as security and usability. For
instance, a system easy to use is also easy to attack in the meantime. That is to say, a user needs to make efforts to
enable a more secure system by participating the key agreement process (high degree of user involvement).
Overall, radio-based key generation system is a good choice because it achieves high robustness, usability, practica-
bility and ubiquity. Although the security of such system is medium due to the broadcast nature of wireless radio link,
radio-based schemes apply to a variety of IoT devices as most devices possess wireless communication functionalities.
Audio-based systems suffer from low transmission distance and depend on microphone and speaker which are not
always available on IoT devices. The usability and practicability, therefore, are relatively low. The usability of IMU
sensor based schemes is low because they also require users to perform some actions such as walking, shaking, bumping
to create some common context information. But their practicability is high thanks to the wide availability of IMU
sensors on modern IoT devices. Miscellaneous sensors based systems, due to their dependence on special hardware,
suffer from low usability, practicability and ubiquity. However, the security in turn benefits from these drawbacks.
This is because the signals of such miscellaneous sensors such as user’s biometrics are usually hard to copy, fabricate,
mimic and eavesdrop. Similar to miscellaneous sensors, multi-modality sensing approaches also achieve low usability,
practicability and ubiquity. Additionally, the survey results in Table. 4 point out some future research directions because
it reveals the research gap in each category. For example, the robustness of miscellaneous sensor and multi-modality
sensing approaches need more research input.
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5 ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
Due to the open nature of wireless communications, attacker’s ability of observing users, and side channel information
leakage, there are various attacks on an IoT key generation system. In this section, we summarise these attacks and
discuss possible countermeasures to address these security issues. Because of the diversity in hardware and design
principles, different key generation systems face different attacks. Therefore, we only focus on attacks encountered by
most key generation systems.
We omit some common attacks that have been well investigated in IoT security such as MITM attack, replay attack,
DOS attack etc. These attacks have been well examined and many approaches have been proposed to detect and counter
such attacks. For example, a MITM attack can be solved by interlock protocol [94] or message authentication code
(MAC). A replay attack can be addressed by using nounces, timestamps or tagging each message with a session ID [76].
There are numerous studies in the literature to detect and prevent DOS attack such as [122, 127]. For a comprehensive
survey of attacks in IoT, interested readers can refer to [23, 144].
5.1 Eavesdropping Attack
Eavesdropping attack is one of the typical attacking approaches in wireless networks. It has received much attention
because many adversarial attacks often follow the eavesdropping activity, such as the MITM attack and the hear-and-fire
attack [53]. The attacker, Eve, can simply sit somewhere in the propagation path and eavesdrop all the relevant network
traffic for later analysis. Hence, it is easy to perform and hard to detect.
In a key generation protocol, Alice and Bob often need to exchange some information to correct the mismatches
between their initial keys (this step is often called information reconciliation). So Eve can eavesdrop this information
and utilise it to improve the success rate. There are two ways to address this issue.
• Design a key generation protocol that does not exchange any information. For instance, Ali et al. [2] proposed
a zero reconciliation protocol for wearable devices. To eliminate reconciliation, they first proposed a filtering
scheme to significantly improve RSSI correlation between the two communication parties without reducing
entropy. Then, they designed an approach that can ensure near-perfect key agreement. The proposed system can
achieve 99.8% key matching rate but the KGR is extremely low (only 0.057–0.141 bit/s).
• Key generation protocol needs to ensure that Eve still cannot recover the correct key even with information
exchange. Most key generation systems adopt this strategy but in different ways. For example, Xu et al. [141]
exchanged the indices of the samples used for key generation. With the eavesdropped information, the attacker
can at most achieve 60% KAR. In [67, 138], the authors used compressive sensing to compress the generated keys
into a lower dimension space. Even Eve intercepts the compressed signal, she cannot recover the original key
due to the secrecy of compressive sensing theory [90].
Apart from the eavesdropper in radio-based key generation, there are other types of eavesdroppers such as ac-
celerometer eavesdropper in accelerometer-based system [126] and audio eavesdropper in audio-based system [74].
Most studies find that if the distance between the eavesdropper and legitimate device exceeds a certain threshold, she
cannot use her measurements to generate the same key. Therefore, although eavesdropping attack is easy to perform,
most key generation systems can defend it by careful design.
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5.2 Predictable Channel Attack
Predictable channel attack means attackers can perform some regular actions intentionally to cause predictable changes
in the received signal of legitimate devices. Jana et al. [44] first identified this attack and later it is found that the
majority of RSSI-based key generation systems suffer from such attack. Unfortunately, the majority of RSSI-based key
generation systems omit this attack in their evaluation such as [1, 92, 102, 138, 152, 156]. Recently, researchers found
that CSI can counter this attack because it can extract channel information from different subcarriers and attacker’s
movement has different impact on different subcarriers [70, 132]. To counter predictable channel attack for RSSI-based
key generation system, researchers have proposed a variety of methods by introducing different kinds of randomness
into the channels, such as using multiple attennas [102], rotating attenna [123], transmitting random signals [124], and
other schemes [16, 32, 34, 41, 75].
5.3 Mimicking Attack
In the mimicking attack, Eve has the ability to observe how the user is walking, shaking and moving. Then she can repeat
user’s actions with the aim of generating a similar signal, so that she can extract the same key. Mimicking attack is a
major threat to motion-based key generation systems because user’s motions are easy to observe and intimate. Although
a large portion of these systems have verified the security against mimicking attacks such as [79, 109, 110, 137, 141].
The evaluation is conducted in a controlled environment and using small size dataset. For example, Shake well before
use [79] recruited 30 participants while Walkie-Talkie [141] and Shake-n-Shack [110] recruited 20 volunteers only.
Traditionally, it is believed that user’s biometrics are hard to copy and fabricate. However, recent studies found
that attackers can hack a biometics-based authentication system by generating highly similar biometrics. For example,
Eberz et al. [26] developed an ECG synthesise system to spoof an ECG-based authentication system. The synthetic ECG
signals are very close to the ECG of a benign user and the hacking success rate is as high as 81%. The feasibility of
using synthetic ECG signal to hack an ECG-based key generation system such as [67, 98] has not been investigated yet.
But this technology clearly poses a threat to ECG-based key generation systems.
To mitigate the mimicking attack, we can use signals from multiple sensors such as [36, 69]. It is hard for Eve to
obtain similar signals from different sensors by eavesdropping and mimicking. But the cost and practicability of using
multi-modality sensing is a concern.
5.4 Side Channel Attack
Attackers are becoming more and more powerful with the development of technology. For example, Davis et al. [22]
found that when an audio signal hits an object, it will cause minute vibrations which can be measured by high-speed
camera. They proposed a system to recover the sound from a video. With this technology, attackers can hack vibration
or acoustic based key generation systems such as [54, 74, 126]. Recent studies also showed that videos can be used
to recover the motion data of people’s activities [145]. Therefore, motion or vibration-based key generation schemes
are vulnerable to a video analysis attack. In fact, Bruesch et al. [11] have demonstrated the feasibility of using video
to estimate user’s gait signals. To defend against such attacks, one solution is to introduce random signal in the key
generation process as how researchers did to counter eavesdropping attack above. Another possible solution is to
borrow the idea from face recognition with liveness detection system [8]. The purpose of liveness detection is to detect
whether a face is âĂĲaliveâĂİ or just a fraudulent reproduction. Therefore, by incorporating liveness detection, a key
generation system can defend such attacks when they reproduce a similar signal from side channel information.
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Table 5. Vulnerability of key generation systems to different attacks. (❍–low, ◗–medium, ●–high).
Eavesdropping
Attack
Predictable Channel
Attack
Mimicking
Attack
Side channel
Attack
Radio ● ● ◗ ◗
Audio ● ❍ ◗ ❍
IMU sensors ● ◗ ● ◗
Camera ● ◗ ● ◗
Miscellaneous sensors ◗ ❍ ◗ ❍
Hybrid approaches ◗ ◗ ❍ ❍
5.5 Summary
The vulnerability of key generation systems subject to different attacks is summarised in Table 5. We can see that
different key generation systems have varied vulnerability levels to attacks.
The rapid development of technology is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it brings more opportunities
for researchers to design novel IoT key generation systems by using novel algorithms (e.g., deep learning [130])
and hardware (e.g., bio-sensors [95]). On the other hand, attackers can use more powerful devices (e.g., high-speed
camera [22]) to perform more advanced attacks. Therefore, in addition to the above well studied attacks, researchers
should consider potential attacks especially that exploit side channel information leakage. Additionally, when we survey
the literature, we find that almost all the studies focus on developing novel key generation systems but very limited
work has been done to analyse the vulnerabilities of existing systems. Some challenging studies are hard to conduct but
of great value. To name a few, Edman et al. [27] challenged the common assumption in physical layer key generation
that if Eve is more than half wavelength away from Alice or Bob, her channel measurements have low correlation with
that of Alice and Bob. Instead, they found that there is a strong correlation in Eve’s channel measurements which is
contradictory to previous results. Bruesch et al. [11] analysed the security of several gait-based key generation system
and pointed out that there is a bias in the generated keys. Therefore, studies from the perspective of attackers need
more research effort.
6 CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS
So far, we have surveyed recent advances on IoT key generation, compared their performance and analysed various
security issues. A number of research challenges still require further investigation. We discuss some of them and point
out several future directions in this section.
• Key Generation for Emerging Technologies. Previous radio-based key generation works have been mainly
focused on short range communications such as Wi-Fi and ZigBee. However, limited efforts have been made in
key generation using newwireless communication technologies such as Low power wide area networks (LPWAN)
and 5G. LPWAN have started to prevail in the last few years, such as LoRa/LoRaWAN, NB-IoT. The key challenge
for LPWAN is channel reciprocity may not hold any more for those techniques [138]. LoRaWAN protocol
specifies a one second delay between the uplink and downlink transmissions, which will significantly impact
the channel reciprocity. NB-IoT employs the FDD duplex mode where the channel reciprocity may not hold at
all [63]. Therefore, how to key generate keys in low channel reciprocity scenarios remains an open research
problem. Another hot communication technology is 5G which uses several new features such as millimeter-wave
(mmWave), massive MIMO and highly directional beamforming [143]. The current study on 5G key generation
28 Xu et al.
still rely on simulation and practical key generation systems have not been developed yet. In fact, these new
communication technologies bring not only challenges but also opportunities. For instance, high directional
beamforming can be used to thwart co-located attackers in key generation [47]. We believe that designing key
generation systems for these emerging communication technologies will be a hot research direction in the future.
• Group Key Generation.With the growing number of IoT devices, it is more common to pair a group of IoT
devices in the same network or context. Unfortunately, most existing key generation systems work in peer-to-peer
communication mode. While many studies have been conducted in group key generation [33, 71, 72, 93, 125, 136],
they suffer from either efficiency or practicability issues. Traditional pairwise key generation protocols cannot
be directly extended to group key generation scenarios. This is because the secret information between a pair of
legitimate devices cannot be efficiently and securely distributed to other IoT devices. The naive solution is first to
apply pairwise key generation schemes to generate a secure channel between each pair of nodes, then exchange
some information to agree on the same group key. However, the computation and communication overhead of
this approach increase linearly with the group size. Some solutions are impracticable because off-the-shelf IoT
devices cannot provide the channel characteristics they used (e.g., phase [125]). Therefore, how to design an
efficient and practical group key generation protocol remains an open question.
• User Friendliness. From a user friendliness point of view, user needs to have minimal involvement during
key generation process. Unfortunately, the majority of systems described in this paper require user in the loop.
User plays a crucial role in some key generation systems, such as introducing randomness by shaking [79, 110]
or walking [137, 141], comparing results [80, 103]. Even for radio-based key generation when two devices are
static, the channel variance is actually caused by moving subjects or objects in the environment. This is why
several previous surveys classify key generation systems based on HCI [20, 144]. For example, Chong et al. [20]
provided an in-depth analysis of device pairing schemes from the perspective of user involvement. A desirable key
generation system requires as little user involvement as possible. However, a highly user friendly key generation
system does not come for free but it decreases the performance. For example, the zero-interaction device pairing
scheme proposed by Miettinen et al. [81] does not need user interaction but requires a long time to complete
authentication. Therefore, how to design a fast and practical key generation system with little user involvement
requires further investigation.
• Balancing Different Design Requirements.While the battery life and processing capability of IoT devices
have been greatly improved over the past few years, some categories of devices are still limited by on-board
resources such as wearable and IMD devices. Resource constraints have been long identified as the primary
challenge in designing an IoT system and researchers have made significant efforts and progress to find a
balance between performance and resource consumption. With regards to key generation protocols, this trade-off
becomes more complex. As mentioned earlier, there are several requirements of a desirable IoT key generation
protocol such as security, efficiency and usability. There is a fundamental tension between these goals, particularly
when examining these goals in the context of realistic application scenarios. Unfortunately, finding a suitable
balance between these tensions is non-trivial. Therefore, we believe that the conflicting requirements of security,
reliability, and usability in IoT devices will still be a research problem in the near future and motivate more
inventive works.
• Theory vs Practice.Many studies are based on theoretical analysis and simulation evaluation [125, 136, 149, 153],
while many other studies are based on real-world measurements using off-the-shelf hardware [29, 49, 102, 110, 137,
141]. Only a small portion of studies in the literature present both theoretical analysis and practical validation
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such as [14, 138]. This is probably because the results obtained from theory may not apply to real-world
measurements directly. For example, according to wireless communication theory [31], the channel will be
statistically uncorrelated if two devices are separated by half wavelength away. In practice, however, this is not
always true because of the poor multi-path conditions and interference in some environments [27, 92]. As another
example, although channel phase randomness has been extensively investigated for key generation [125, 129],
it is only validated in simulation. Unfortunately, off-the-shelf devices cannot provide accurate channel phase
information due to noise and offset [148]. Therefore, a solid and rigorous work needs both theory support and
field validation. Unfortunately, this gap has not been filled so far.
7 CONCLUSION
IoT is seen as the future of the world. Therefore, ensuring secure communication in IoT system is of upmost importance.
In the past few years, a large number of key generation systems have been proposed and designed. In this paper, we
have reviewed, analysed, and compared recent solutions. Moreover, we analysed the security of key generation systems
and pointed out several potential future research directions. This list of existing systems discussed in this survey is
by no means exhaustive but covers the majority of recent advances and directions. We hope this survey can help
researchers identify research gaps and find solutions easily. We also would like to invite all researchers to broaden this
exciting area and provide new insights.
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